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1.  Introduction
Possibly the most striking phenomena in the UK labour market
over the last couple of decades has been the massive rise in wage
inequality.  Wage differentials have risen to a degree that pay inequality
is now higher than at any time over the last century.  This increase in
cross sectional inequality has been widely documented. (For example
see: Gosling, Machin and Meghir, 1996; Gregg and Machin, 1994;
Schmitt, 1995; Machin, 1996).1  Dispersion appears to have risen in
almost every measurable dimension.  Looking at groups of individuals
with different observable characteristics (such as education, experience,
age, occupation, etc) one finds an increase in dispersion both between
and within these groups.
Despite this comprehensive literature on the cross sectional rise
in inequality, little attention has been paid to the evolution of
individual’s earnings through time.2  Observed differences in a cross
section of earnings may reflect long run permanent differences or short
run transitory differences between individuals.  The relative importance
of these two components  has implications for the way in which we
view the rise in inequality and may throw some light onto the likely
causes of increased inequality.  From a welfare point of view, if
earnings dispersion is composed of largely transitory shocks to
individuals then inequality is in some sense being shared amongst
individuals.  However, if earnings differences are largely permanent
then inequality has much more serious implications for individuals’
lifetime welfare.  From the point of view of explaining the rise in
inequality, an analysis of changes in the permanent and transitory
components of earnings may shed some light on the various competing
hypotheses.  For example, a popular view is that inequality is rising due
to skill biased technological change resulting in an increase in the
demand for skilled relative to unskilled labour.  One would expect this
2to be reflected in a rise in the permanent component of earnings, as
skills are probably fairly permanent to the individual.
In this paper I study the pattern of individual male wages over
time in Great Britain.  In order to assess the relative importance of
permanent and transitory components of individual wages I require
panel data on individuals with a sufficient time dimension.  For this I
use the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) which covers
some 180,000 males for the period 1975 to 1994.  I divide the data into
year of birth cohorts and analyse the auto-covariance structure of
hourly earnings for each cohort.  The covariances display an increasing
pattern over the life cycle and also with time.  Defining the permanent
element of earnings as a non-mean reverting component and the
transitory element as a serially correlated, mean reverting component
I estimate error component models decomposing earnings into these
two parts and analysing changes in these over time.  The earnings
process is adequately fit by a permanent component, modelled as a
random walk in age and a highly persistent serially correlated transitory
component, with weights on these components that vary each year.
Nearly half of the rise in inequality can be explained in terms of a rise
in the permanent component, with the rest being explained by the
persistent transitory effect.
In the next section I present some reasons why it is important to
study the dynamic process of earnings and briefly review some of the
existing evidence on the dynamics of individual earnings.  Section 3
describes the data and the construction of the cohorts.  Section 4
presents evidence on the auto-covariance structure of hourly earnings
by cohort.  Section 5 fits error components models to this covariance
structure, decomposing the rise in dispersion into that accounted for by
changes in the permanent and transitory components.  Section 6 offers
some conclusions.
2.  Why are Earnings Dynamics Important?
Recent cross section studies of wage inequality have established
a widening of the pay distribution throughout the 1980s in the UK.
3This is in contrast to the experience of  most other developed countries
with the exception of the US, which has also experienced a large
increase in wage dispersion.  (See Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower,
1995, Machin, 1996, for an international comparison and Juhn,
Murphy and Pierce, 1993, Levy and Murnane, 1992 for a more
detailed account of the US experience.)  This increased dispersion has
occurred both between and within groups with the same observable
characteristics.  So wage differentials between different education,
experience and skill groups have increased over the last decade as well
as wage dispersion within these groups.  Whilst this literature has
documented the patterns in the structure of earnings and how they have
changed, little attention has been paid to the nature of earnings
dynamics and how these may have changed over time.  This issue has
important implications for the welfare consequences of cross section
inequality and may shed some light on the possible causes of the rise
in inequality. 
Atkinson, Bourguingon and Morrisson (1992) provide an
excellent survey of the earnings mobility literature and highlight the
limitations of cross sectional analysis of inequality.  Repeated
snapshots of the distribution of earnings tell us little about the extent
of movement up and down the distribution each period.  If we are
interested in lifetime inequality and welfare then it is important to look
at the degree of mobility within the distribution.  Cross section
snapshots of the distribution may appear the same, but they may be
concealing a high level of mobility each period.  It is important from a
welfare point of view to understand if people are persistently low paid
or whether this is just a transitory state.
The degree of earnings mobility in the labour market may also
have important policy implications.  For example, the desirability or
otherwise of a minimum wage may depend on the persistence of low
pay.  Many have argued that a minimum wage is an ineffective tool for
tackling inequality since most people it affects are in a transitory state
of low pay.  In the same way, the success of policies that offer
employment subsidies to get the unemployed back to work will depend
4on the degree of progression up the wage distribution of these low wage
entrants.  For example, Bingly, Bjorn and Westegard-Nielson (1995)
study mobility in Denmark and find a high level of progression out of
low wage jobs.  They conclude that policy should be designed to get
the unemployed into jobs, albeit low paid ones from where they can
progress.  One should note that this is in the context of an economy
with a stable wage distribution over the time period of the study.
Atkinson et al (1992) point out that we may be concerned about
mobility as a means to some objective, such as equity, or just in its own
right.  Many people would agree that equality of opportunity is a
desirable feature for a society and a more mobile labour market, where
jobs and earnings are more evenly shared may be favoured on these
grounds.  However, as pointed out by Gittleman and Joyce (1994), a
high level of mobility may also be seen as creating more instability and
a difficulty in retaining one’s position in the earnings distribution, thus
making mobility less desirable.  One person’s rise in the distribution is
another’s fall.  So the question of whether more or less mobility is
preferred is a normative one with no clear answer.
So far I have been concentrating on intra-generational mobility,
and this is what I will study in this paper.  However, the related
question of inter-generational earnings mobility is also very important.
When considering the degree of inter-generational mobility, most
people are likely to favour higher mobility on the grounds of equality
of opportunity.  Somehow, the idea that you will inherit the position
that your father had in the earnings distribution seems less deserving
than that of you retaining the position you have had in the past.  Recent
work on the degree of inter-generational mobility of earnings (Dearden,
Machin and Reed, 1997) has found a high correlation between the
earnings and education of children and their fathers, suggesting quite
low levels of inter-generational mobility.
The degree of earnings mobility takes on even more importance
in the light of the huge rise in cross sectional earnings dispersion.
Given that dispersion in the cross section has risen we may expect there
to have been changes in the dynamic structure of earnings.  How
5Wit ' bit X it % U it (1)
permanent and transitory components of earnings have changed over
time has potentially serious implications for the welfare consequences
of the rise in inequality.  If the rise in earnings inequality is due to a rise
in permanent inequality and mobility has decreased then this can have
important implications for individuals’ welfare.  However, if the rise in
earnings inequality is due to an increased dispersion of the transitory
component of earnings and mobility has increased then it is not
necessarily true that the dispersion of lifetime earnings has increased.
Nethertheless, the welfare consequences in this case may be serious if
individuals find it difficult to transfer income between periods and
smooth short run fluctuations in earnings, due to say imperfect capital
markets.  A decomposition of the rise in inequality into that due to
permanent and transitory components of earnings is essential for
gauging the significance of the rise in inequality in welfare terms.  Of
course, if one believes the permanent income model of consumption
then a study of the pattern of consumption inequality should provide
some answers to this question.3 
An analysis of the dynamics of the earnings structure may also
shed some light on the possible causes of rising inequality.  Juhn,
Murphy and Pierce (1993) break down the rise in US wage inequality
from 1963-89 into within and between group components.  Wages for
individual i in time period t are defined as:
The rise in wage inequality is decomposed into that due to
changes in the observable characteristics of the workforce Xit, that due
to changes in the returns to these observable characteristics bit, and that
due to changes in the unobservable component of earnings Uit.  They
find that about two thirds of the rise in inequality is due to a rise in the
unobserved component of earnings.  (Schmitt (1995) carries out a
similar analysis for Britain and finds that about 60% of the rise in
earnings inequality between 1974 and 1988 occurred within education
and experience groups.)
6Wit ' bit X it % dt Vit (2)
Juhn et al (1993) interpret their results as indicative of a rise in
the return to unobserved skill brought about by an increase in the
demand for skilled relative to unskilled labour.  This hypothesis is best
presented by further decomposing the unobserved component of wages
into unobserved ability, Vit  and the price of unobserved ability, dt  to
give a wage equation of the form:
They assume that the distribution of unobserved ability, Vit is
unchanged over the sample period.  If their hypothesis is correct then
the rise in the unobserved component is driven by a rise in dt, the price
of unobserved skill.  Given that unobserved skill is generally a
permanent asset, one would expect the rise in inequality to be largely
composed of a rise in permanent inequality.  In order to test their
hypothesis, one needs to be able to take out the individual effect in this
equation and identify the relative importance of changes in the
permanent and transitory components of earnings.
Of course, even when it is possible to decompose the rise earnings
inequality into permanent and transitory components, it is not always
clear what interpretation should be given to these.  Typically the
permanent component is associated with relatively stable individual
characteristics such as unobserved education and skill effects.  On the
other hand the transitory component is identified with what we may
believe to be rather more unstable determinants of the rise in earnings
dispersion, such as the decline in union power, increased job turnover
or the falling value of the minimum wage.  However, it is not obvious
that this distinction is correct.  For example, it is entirely possible that
a rise in demand for skilled labour may result in an increase in both the
permanent and transitory variances.  If skill biased technical change
leads to significant changes in the workplace then more workers may
behave like workers in new jobs, resulting in greater transitory
fluctuations in earnings.  (This idea was put forward by Larry Katz in
his discussion of Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).)  So although it is
7interesting to analyse the changes in these components of earnings, the
results of such an exercise may throw up many questions of
interpretation.
The existing literature on the dynamics of individual wages is
predominantly from US data (again see Atkinson et al, 1992, for a
survey of the literature on earnings dynamics).  The few early papers
that have been written in this area were generally carried out without
any clear reference to the rise in wage inequality.  Early work
concentrated on fitting statistical models to the earnings process.
Lillard and Willis (1978) fit an error components model to male
earnings from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and find a
substantial permanent element, predicting a low degree of mobility.
Similarly, Lillard and Weiss (1979) estimate error components models
for American scientists for 1960-70, incorporating some time variation
with a random growth rate term. 
MaCurdy (1982) estimates models of weekly and hourly earnings
growth for prime age males also using the PSID from 1967 to 1976.  He
finds that a stationary MA(2) process adequately describes the path of
wage growth.  This is consistent with the presence of a permanent effect
in wage levels.  Abowd and Card (1989) fit models of the covariance
structure of earnings and hours changes for three different US datasets.
They find that earnings growth is adequately described by a non-
stationary bivariate MA(2) process that is compatible with the presence
of a permanent effect, possibly a random walk, in earnings levels.  Both
these studies are consistent with the presence of a permanent individual
component of earnings and a serially correlated transitory effect.
However, neither of them estimate the relative importance of these
components and, perhaps more significantly, neither model the
changing structure of these over time.
More recently, Gottshalk and Moffit (1995) have used PSID data
to estimate permanent and transitory components of earnings for white
male household heads aged 22 to 59 and study how these have
changed over time.  Splitting their data into ten year birth cohorts they
model the permanent component of earnings as an individual effect (a
8random walk in age) and the transitory component as a low order
serially correlated effect (an ARMA(1,1).  The parameters of these are
allowed to vary over time.  They find that the permanent component of
earnings explains about 40% of the rise in inequality between 1967 and
1987, the rest being explained by a rise in transitory inequality.  In a
separate piece of work Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) use a simpler
procedure to estimate the rise in the components of earnings. They split
their sample into two periods, defining permanent earnings as an
individual’s average earnings in each period and transitory earnings as
deviations from permanent earnings in each year.  They find that the
variance of the permanent and transitory components rise by similar
proportions.  Given the permanent component is the largest, this
implies that about two thirds of the rise in earnings dispersion is due to
a rise in the permanent component of earnings and one third is due to
the transitory component.  If one thinks of unobserved ability as being
a relatively permanent effect then their results suggest that Juhn et al’s
hypothesis is important but may not be the whole story.  They argue
that the literature on earnings inequality has overlooked an important
aspect, namely the rise in the instability of earnings.  Possible
explanations they put forward for this are a rise in job shopping, part
time work or the decline in union power.
Gittleman and Joyce (1994) use matched cross sections from the
Current Population Survey from 1967-91 to estimate patterns of
earnings mobility in the US.  They find differences across demographic
groups in terms of mobility.  In particular, the less educated and blacks
appear to have less stable earnings. Looking at changes over time, they
find little evidence of a changing short run mobility structure.  This is
consistent with Gottschalk and Moffitt’s findings of proportional
increases in permanent and transitory components. 
Buchinsky and Hunt (1996) analyse wage mobility using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth from 1979 to 1991.  This data
is a sample of individuals aged 14-24 in 1979.  They use summary
inequality measures and study how these change when computed over
different time horizons.  Their results suggest that when dispersion is
9measured over a four year period, wage inequality is reduced by 12-
26% in comparison to the one year cross section figure due to the
mobility of individuals in the wage distribution each year.
Nethertheless, they also report falling mobility over the sample period,
implying that the sharp rise in inequality observed is actually larger
than it appears.  However, since the NLSY is a cohort with no new
entry it is quite possible they are confounding life cycle effects with
time effects.  This last result may be indicative of falling mobility within
a cohort as it ages, something which is implied by my results below.
The evidence from the US is indicative of a rise in earnings
inequality driven by substantial increases in both permanent and
transitory earnings.  As a consequence, mobility rates within the
distribution are fairly stable or may actually be falling for younger
workers.  This is very worrying from a welfare point of view as the
increasing differences between individuals appear to be largely
permanent.
Early work from the UK (Creedy and Hart, 1979; Hart, 1976;
Department of Employment, 1973, 1977) established a high degree of
correlation between individuals’ earnings in different time periods.
This correlation declines at longer lags but is still indicative of a strong
permanent component of earnings.  For example, the Department of
Employment study reports a correlation coefficient of 0.65 between
weekly earnings of manual males in 1970 and 1971.  This declines to
0.52 when comparing 1970 with 1974.  More recently, Gregory and
Elias (1994) use the New Earnings Survey Panel to study transition
rates out of the bottom earnings quintile. They find that young males
in the bottom quintile in 1976 face a low probability of remaining there
by 1984 and 1990.  However, exit rates are lower for older males and
for females in general.  They conclude that the experience of  low pay
is closely linked to life cycle patterns of pay, but that for some low pay
is a persistent phenomena.
Stewart and Swaffield (1996) use the British Household Panel
Survey to study transitions into and out of various low pay thresholds.
They report a high degree of persistence of low pay for certain
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individuals.  For example, 75% of those low paid in both 1991 and
1992 remain low paid in 1993.  They also emphasise that the low paid
are more likely to move into non-employment than those further up the
distribution.  As a consequence, restricting attention to those in
employment will overstate the probability of moving up the
distribution.
A drawback with much of the UK analysis is that it has not
addressed the question of whether there have been changes in the
dynamics of the earnings process.  However, in an ingenious piece of
work, Blundell and Preston (1995a, 1995b) develop an intertemporal
model of consumption expenditure.  They show that permanent and
transitory income inequality can be identified from cross section data
on consumption and income inequality.  The results of their analysis of
Family Expenditure Survey Data from 1970-92 suggest a steady
increase in permanent inequality over this period coupled with a sharp
rise in transitory inequality in the later part of the 1980s.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the UK work on the
dynamics of the earnings process.  Before going on to look at these
issues I will first provide an outline of the data that I will use for this
analysis.
3.  Data Description
The New Earnings Survey is an annual survey, conducted in
April, of roughly 1% of employees in employment in Great Britain.4
The sample frame is derived from those with a National Insurance
number ending with two particular digits.  Employees’ workplaces are
obtained through the Inland Revenue tax register using current PAYE
records and the survey is sent for completion by the employer. About
75% of the responses are collected in this way.  The remainder are
obtained directly from large public and private organisations who
supply details of all employees with the selected National Insurance
numbers.  Employers are required by law to respond to the survey
under the Statistics of Trade Act 1947.  Individuals can be matched
across years by their National Insurance number to form a panel of
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employees in employment.  The panel is characterised by  a constant
churning of the sample as new individuals enter the labour market and
older ones exit, maintaining the sample size each year.   A clear benefit
of the NES panel is that if individuals do go missing in a given year
they still have the potential of re-entering in later years.  I have access
to the data for the years 1975 to 1994.
Details on individual characteristics are limited5, but there is a
wealth of detailed information on earnings, hours, industry,
occupation, sector and region.  Individuals may be missing from the
panel for a number of reasons.  They may leave the stock of employees
for retirement, unemployment, inactivity or self employment.
Alternatively, their weekly pay may fall below that required to pay
income tax, in which case they will not appear on Inland Revenue
records.  They may also be untraced because they have left the
employer they worked for when the tax records were collected.6 
Because of this, the NES is likely to under sample individuals
with weekly earnings which fall below the income tax threshold.  This
is predominantly a problem for part time workers, most of whom are
women.  In the empirical work here I restrict the sample to full time
males between the ages of 22 and 59 who are unlikely to be seriously
affected by the PAYE cut off.  However, the NES is also likely to
under sample employees in small organisations and those who
experience high rates of job turnover.  This is a potential problem for
the sample that I am using here.
Attempting to resolve these attrition problems in the NES is
difficult since there is no information on why an individual may have
been absent in any given year or any good instruments to model this
with.  Therefore, it is not possible to estimate a structural model of
presence or absence in the panel.  However, it is likely that the panel
will contain those with more stable employment histories and as a
consequence may overstate the permanent element of earnings.
For the empirical analysis, I categorise individuals into age
cohorts and follow them through time.  This allows an analysis of the
covariance structure of individuals’ earnings at the same age but at
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different points in time, forming the basis for an examination of
whether the covariance structure has changed over time.7  The cohorts
are arranged by each year of birth and are tracked over the period 1975
to 1994.  So the youngest cohort is aged 22 in 1994 (born in 1972), the
next youngest is 22 in 1993 (born in 1971) and so on down to the
oldest cohort, aged 59 in 1975 (born in 1916).  The cohorts can be
present for between 1 and 20 years depending on their date of birth.
This gives a total of 57 cohorts.
The earnings measure is the log of real hourly earnings, defined
as gross weekly earnings/total weekly hours, deflated by the consumer
price index.  I exclude individuals whose real hourly earnings are
below £0.50/hour or above £100/hour at 1994 prices to reduce the
noise in the data.  In order to maximise the sample utilised I include
every wage observation for each individual over the time period 1975-
1994, allowing individuals to re-enter the panel if they do exit.  This
gives an unbalanced panel since many individuals are not present for
the full 20 years.  The final sample consists of 182,344 men with a
total of 1,298,849 individual-year observations.
The structure of the panel sample is presented in Table 1 for
selected cohorts and years.  The table presents the sample size for a
cohort in a given year and the percentage of these that are still in the
panel after a given number of years.  Taking the cohort born in 1953 as
an example;  1679 individuals from this cohort are present in 1975.
68% of these individuals are still in the panel in 1976, falling to 51%
in 1994.  A large proportion of the attrition appears to occur in the first
year.  Notice that the percentage present may rise again at longer lags
since individuals may re-enter the panel after exit.  So although some
56% of this cohort are present after 10 years, this number rises to 57%
after 15 years.  Also, the size of the cohort may rise over time as new
individuals enter the panel.  For example, by 1980 there are 1955
individuals in this cohort.
The attrition rate is similar for the other age cohorts.  However,
when a cohort approaches retirement age the percentage present falls
more steeply.  For example, for the cohort born in 1933 only 44% of
13
those present in 1975 are there 15 years later  (i.e. at age 57) compared
to 57% and 59% for the cohorts born in 1953 and 1943 respectively.
Attrition rates for other starting years exhibit a similar pattern to that
described above, easing fears that attrition rates may have changed over
time.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the earnings measure for
each year for the full sample.  Real average hourly earnings have risen
by about 31% between 1975 and 1994.  However, this wage growth
has not been uniform across the distribution of wages.  Table 2 also
includes the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution.  We
can see that whilst the 10th percentile has risen by some 13% over the
period, the median has risen by 31% and the 90th percentile by nearly
50%.  It is clear from these figures that there has been a large increase
in dispersion since the late 1970s (see Gosling, Machin and Meghir,
1995 or Gregg and Machin, 1994).  However, they tell us nothing
about the relative importance of permanent and transitory components
of earnings and which is driving the increase in dispersion.  We turn to
this now.
4.  The Covariance Structure of Earnings
To begin with, it is informative to have a description of the
dynamic nature of individual earnings.  For this purpose, I compute the
covariance structure of hourly wages for each cohort described above.
Taking each cohort separately I compute the variance and covariances,
at differing lag lengths, following the cohort through time.  The
methodology used to compute these covariances and their
corresponding standard errors is similar to that employed by Abowd
and Card (1989) and is presented in the technical appendix.
Computing covariance matrices for each cohort gives some 6650
variance and covariance elements so in order to present the patterns in
the data clearly I have taken selected cohorts and auto-covariances.8
Figure 1 presents the variances and covariances of lags 1, 5, 10 and 15
years for selected cohorts born in 1923, 1933, 1943, 1953 and 1963.
 The first point to notice is that the auto-covariances display different
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patterns across cohorts.  The younger the cohort the faster the rise in
the variance and covariances, even over the same time period.  In fact,
the cohort born in 1923 shows no significant rise in dispersion between
1975 and 1982.
For all cohorts the covariances are all positive and quite large in
magnitude relative to the variances.  They fall quite sharply for the first
couple of lags and then appear to asymptote to a long run level at
longer lags.  This is consistent with the presence of a permanent
individual component of earnings and a transitory component that is
serially correlated.  However, the relative magnitudes of the
covariances differ across cohorts.  For the younger cohorts the ratio of
the longer lag covariances to the variances is greater than that for the
older cohorts.  While the variances will reflect both permanent and
transitory components of earnings, the longer lag covariances will
largely reflect the permanent  component of earnings.  As such, Figure
1 indicates that the proportion of earnings that is accounted for by the
permanent component is larger for older cohorts.
It appears that the covariance structure of earnings is changing
over the life cycle.  There are a number of theoretical reasons that can
explain why this may be the case.  For example, matching models
where information about the individual’s ability is revealed on the job
imply that wage dispersion within a cohort will rise as the cohort ages
and more information is revealed (See Jovanovic, 1979)9. 
To look at these life cycle effects more clearly we need to strip
out the time effects that are present in these within cohort covariances.
Figure 2 presents the auto-covariances by age for the years 1975, 1980,
1985, 1990 and 1994.  Each panel of the Figure is now taking out time
effects and we are left with life cycle and cohort effects.  The variance
and covariances of hourly wages rise quite sharply over the life cycle
up until about age 40 after which they are fairly stable.  Notice also
that the variances and covariances of different lags appear to rise at
similar rates over the life cycle.  This is consistent with the presence of
a permanent component that rises with age until an individual reaches
their 40s.  Looking across the different panels we can see that the
15
wiat ' a tµiat % dt?iat (3)
variances and covariances are larger in later years.  It is  also interesting
to note that the life cycle profile appears to be steeper in later years.
This is compatible with increasing returns to the permanent component
over time, resulting in a faster rise in dispersion of wages for younger
cohorts.  It is also apparent that the difference between the variance
and longer covariances has increased with time.  This is an indication
that the transitory component of earnings may also have risen over
time.
5.  Variance Components Models
Having presented some of the trends in the data the aim in this
section is to fit a parsimonious model to the auto-covariance structure
of earnings for all cohorts.  We have seen that there is evidence of a
strong permanent component of earnings and also a transitory
component that may exhibit some degree of serial correlation.  Both of
these components are likely to have changed in magnitude over the
sample period.  In addition there appears to be important differences in
the covariance structure over the life cycle.  The error components
model has to be general enough to allow for these patterns in the data.
At the same time our interest lies in modelling how the components of
earnings have changed over time.  The following model of earnings
provides a general equation which encompasses many of the features
in the data:
Here wiat are log real hourly earnings for individual i, at age a and time
t.  The first term, a tµiat, is the permanent component of earnings.  I will
estimate models where the µiat is a random individual effect, i.e. µiat =
µi where  µi   is independently distributed across individuals  µi  ~ (0,s
µ
2).
Alternatively, µiat may be a random walk term;  µiat =  µia-1t-1 + piat where
piat  ~ iid  (0,s pa2)  and  the  variance  s pa2  may differ with age.   a t  is a
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parameter that allows the permanent effect to vary over time.  This may
seem a little odd but I use the term permanent here to signify non-mean
reverting effects.  One could think of the term µiat as a proxy for ability
(or revealed ability) and the term a t as the return on this ability.   In the
same way the transitory effect, dt?iat, may exhibit persistence through
some serial correlation structure, but this effect is mean reverting.  So
?iat may be some ARMA process, where the parameters of this process
may vary with time.  An alternative way of allowing time variation of
this effect is to let dt to vary with time.  We may think of measurement
error in this model as coming through the transitory component.
The parameters of these models are fit to the covariance structure
for each cohort using minimum distance methods of estimation.  For
estimation I have dropped those cohorts that are in the sample for less
than five periods.  This leaves us with 49 cohorts and a total of 6610
variances and covariances.  More details of this estimation procedure
are presented in the technical appendix, along with the inference
procedures.  Essentially, the covariance structure implied by each
model is mapped to the observed covariance structure.  The sum of the
squared distance between these is minimised, weighted by an
appropriate weighting matrix.  The optimal choice for this weighting
matrix is the inverse of the covariance matrix of these covariance
elements, i.e. the inverse of the matrix of fourth moments.  However,
Altonji and Segal (1994) show that this can seriously bias the estimates
due to correlation between measurement error in the second and fourth
moments.  They recommend the use of equally weighted minimum
distance, i.e. using an identity matrix as the weighting matrix.  I follow
their procedure here and weight using an identity matrix.10
Before presenting the results I should like to make a point about
the expected fit of such error components models when such large
samples are used to compute the covariance elements.  When
computing inference statistics of the models fit with these large
samples, any small deviation from the expected distribution will be
multiplied up, resulting in rejection of the model at conventional
critical values.  For this reason, I do not expect to find a model that
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wiat ' µi % eit (4)
wiat ' µi % ?it (5)
will not be rejected by standard significance levels.  My aim is to find
the best fitting of a number of models.  Table 3 presents the results
of fitting assorted estimates of equation (3) to the 6610 covariance
elements, with different restrictions applied to the parameters.  Column
1 presents an estimate of the simple canonical permanent-transitory
model of earnings, whereby earnings consist of a stationary individual
effect and a white noise transitory effect.  In terms of equation (3) we
have:
where  µi  is a stationary random effect,  µi  ~ (0,s  µ2)  and  eit is a white
noise error term, eit ~ (0,s e2).  This model implies that the variances and
covariances are constant over time and age and that all the covariances
are the same at all lags.  This simple model is clearly rejected by the
large chi-square value in column 1.  Nethertheless, the estimated
parameters provide some evidence of a permanent individual
component of earnings.    
Casual observation of the covariances presented in Figures 1 and
2 suggests three reasons why the simple canonical permanent-transitory
model is not a good approximation to the earnings process.  Firstly, the
covariance elements are not all the same at all lags, secondly the
variances and covariances are not stationary through our sample period
and thirdly they are not stationary over the life cycle.  Column 2
attempts to deal with the first of these problems.  We have seen that the
covariances appear to diminish as the lag length increases, sharply for
the first couple of lags and then more smoothly at longer lags.  This is
consistent with some serial correlation in the transitory error term.
Therefore, column 2 presents a model with an individual random effect
plus an ARMA(1,1) transitory effect.
where:
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?it ' ??it&1 % f it % ?f it&1 (6)
wiat ' a tµiat % dt?it (7)
and f it ~ (0,s f 2) is a white noise error term.  The model fit is somewhat
improved with this extension but the chi-square statistic is still way
above conventional levels.  There is evidence of a strong permanent
individual component of earnings as well as a serially correlated
transitory component that exhibits a high degree of persistence.
In the next column, I present the model of column 2 but allow the
weighting parameters on the permanent and transitory effects to vary
each time period in an attempt to fit the non-stationarity in the auto-
covariances.  (The a and the d are free to vary each year, normalised to
one in 1975.)  Permitting time variation helps to provide a better fit of
the data, however the chi-square statistic is still way above
conventional critical values.
Column 4 replaces the Random Effects term with a Random Walk
in age.  This implies increasing dispersion over the life cycle as
observed in Figure 2.  The weighting parameters are  permitted to vary
over time to capture the changing patterns of the permanent and
transitory components.
where µiat =  µia-1t-1 + piat is the random walk term with initial variance
s 2µ at age 22 and piat  ~ iid (0,s 2p ) is the innovation each period.  ?it is
an ARMA(1,1) as in equation (6), and the a and the d are allowed to
vary freely each year.  The random walk in age provides a significant
improvement over the random effects model.  The variance of the initial
shock is estimated to be zero, implying that all the dispersion at age 22
is transitory.  As each cohort ages the permanent variance increases by
the innovation variance, s 2p each year.  Notice that the weights of both
the permanent and transitory components have risen over the sample
period, the transitory weights rising substantially more.  Most of the
increase in the permanent component occurs in the early 1980s
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whereas the transitory component increases sharply in the late 1980s.
The persistence parameter ? is very high, implying that over 65% of a
shock today will be present in 10 years time.
This random walk model with a constant innovation variance
implies that the life cycle profile of the variance of permanent earnings
is linear over the whole life cycle.  In fact Figure 2  displayed a concave
profile with the variance rising up until the early 40s after which it
remained quite stable.  Given this, I experimented with a specification
which allowed the innovation variance to be different at each age.  The
results implied that the variances decreased over the life cycle and after
age 41 were zero.  Column 5 of the table reports such a specification
also setting the initial variance to zero,  as estimated in column 4.  The
models fit is greatly improved by this generalisation and the chi-
squared value of 11539 (df = 6550) isn’t too bad given the large sample
sizes being dealt with.
The innovation variance s 2pa is largest at the younger ages and
declines with age.  This pattern indicates that the permanent
component of earnings becomes increasingly important over the life
cycle, but at a diminishing rate.  So the proportion of earnings variation
within a cohort accounted for by the permanent component of earnings
rises with age up until the early 40s, after which it remains at it’s
current level.  The model is effectively a random walk in age up to age
41 and after that is a random effects model with the distribution of the
effects fixed at that implied by the random walk.  This model is
consistent with many matching or human capital models whereby
human capital is acquired, or revealed, for the first 20 or so years of
labour market  experience, after which time differences between
individuals stop growing.
The a t ‘price’ term on the permanent component also increases
over the sample period, indicating a rise in the permanent variance of
earnings.  Most of this rise occurs in the early 1980s, after which it rises
slightly up until 1994.  The weights on the transitory component also
rise, by a little more than those on the permanent.  Notice also that
they are quite stable until the mid 1980s, at which point they rise
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sharply for the rest of the sample period.  The persistence parameter
remains high in this specification implying 40% of a shock today will
remain after 10 years.  As such, the transitory component estimated
here is behaving very much like a permanent component itself.
The specification estimated here seems to explain the auto-
covariance structure of wages within and between cohorts well.11
However, one may be concerned that the specification should allow for
separate cohort effects.  It is informative to think about the impact
cohort effects may have on the patterns in the covariance structures
presented above.  If we believe that rising dispersion is a result of
younger cohorts being more heterogeneous then this would serve to
flatten the age profiles in Figure 2 in any given year, since younger
cohorts would enter the labour market with a greater degree of
dispersion.  In fact the age profiles become steeper over time. This
could only happen if the age and time effects were outstripping this rise
in cohort dispersion.  Alternatively, we might believe that successive
cohorts are becoming more homogeneous.  This would explain the
steepness of the lifecycle profile of the auto-covariances but seems
rather unlikely given the large rise in dispersion over the sample period.
Figure 3 plots the actual and predicted variances from the
preferred specification for the cohorts in Figure 1.  It is clear that this
model works pretty well in capturing the age and time profile of the
variance structure for these cohorts. The random walk in age gives the
rising life cycle dispersion for the first 20 or so years.  The increasing
weights on this term explain why dispersion within a cohort  continues
to rise at all ages and also why younger cohorts display a faster rise in
dispersion than older ones, over the same age range.  Therefore, this
estimated specification appears to adequately model the dynamic
structure of earnings for these cohorts.
Having estimated a suitable error components models for the
earnings process we now want to assess the relative importance of the
permanent and transitory components of this process and analyse their
contribution to the rise in the total variance over the sample period.  To
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do this I have computed the predicted variances for each year, holding
fixed the transitory and permanent weighting parameters in turn to
estimate their impact on the total variance.  Figure 4 presents four
different predicted variances for selected cohorts.  The first is the
predicted variance allowing all the parameters to vary.  The second
restricts both the permanent (a t) and transitory weights (dt) to their
1975
values, so the only rise in the variance is that which occurs due to the
random walk term.  The third restricts the permanent weights (a t) to
their 1975 values, giving the transitory effect, and the fourth restricts
the transitory weights (dt) to their 1975 values, giving the permanent
effect. 
Looking at the cohort born in 1953 first we can see that from
1975 to about 1984 all of the rise in the variance is explained by a rise
in the permanent variance, after which time its effect is very small.  In
1985 the transitory component begins to rise sharply and by 1989 has
become slightly more important than the permanent variance.  Taking
the whole period 1975 to 1994, about 60% of the rise in the variance
is explained by a rise in the transitory component, the rest being
accounted for by the permanent component.  The older cohorts portray
a similar pattern, with the rise in the variance from 1975-1994
accounted for by similar increases in the permanent and transitory
components.  For the youngest cohort (born in 1963), the effect of the
transitory component is greater, explaining about 75-80% of the rise in
the variance between 1985 and 1994.  This is because the proportion
of the variance that is permanent is lower for this younger group.
6.  Summary and Conclusions
In this paper I have used the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset
to analyse the covariance structure of individual earnings by cohort
over the period 1975 to 1994.  The results of this analysis of the
earnings process imply that an individuals earnings contain a highly
permanent element, modelled by a random walk in age.  As such, the
proportion of earnings variation accounted for by this permanent
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element increases with age within a cohort.  In addition, the rise in
earnings inequality since the late 1970s appears to be driven by similar
increases in both the permanent and transitory elements of earnings, the
transitory component explaining slightly more.  It is interesting to note
that although the variance of earnings rises smoothly over the 1980s,
the components of variance display different trends.  The permanent
component increases in the most part in the early 1980s, whereas the
rise in the transitory element occurs later in the decade.  This finding
is consistent with the results of Blundell and Preston (1995a, 1995b)
who use a different methodology based on cross sectional differences
in consumption and income inequality described above.
Trying to draw any implications from these results regarding
possible causes of the rise in inequality is difficult.  The substantial rise
in the permanent component is consistent with increasing returns to
skill.  Interpretation of the rise in the transitory component is less clear.
Because of the persistence this exhibits, it is not obvious what this term
is picking up.  It could be some combination of rising skill demand,
decentralisation of bargaining, the decline in the value of the minimum
wage or the end of the social contract.
However, these results do imply that from a welfare point of view
we should be worried about both the level of earnings inequality in the
UK and the increase this has displayed over the last decade or so.  The
observed cross sectional dispersion in earnings reflects largely
persistent differences between individuals.  Against the backdrop of
rising inequality these permanent differences have become greater over
the last decade or so.
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1. There is also a large literature on the rise in wage inequality in the
US.  See Levy and Murnane (1992) for a survey of that literature.
2. This is largely due to limitations in data availability.  However,
see Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992) for a cross country
survey of the earnings dynamics literature to that date.  More recent
work on US data which links the changing cross sectional distribution
of earnings with changes in dynamics can be found in Gottschalk and
Moffitt (1994, 1995), Gittleman and Joyce (1994) and Buchinsky and
Hunt (1996).
3. See Cutler and Katz (1992) for this type of analysis on US data
and Blundell and Preston (1995a, 1995b) for the UK.
4. As such, the sample frame covers about 220,000 individuals.
5. In particular, the NES does not contain data on individuals’
education. However, because my sample is of males aged 22 to 59 their
level of education is unlikely to change much once they are in the
sample.  Therefore, education effects will emerge as a part of the
estimated fixed effect in earnings.
6. In addition, the NES does not cover those in private domestic
service, occupational pensioners, non-salaried directors, those working
outside Great Britain, people working for spouses or clergymen.  As a
consequence, anyone moving into these categories will also exit from
the panel.
7. The aim is to separate out life cycle effects from time effects and
this requires a cohort analysis.  Of course, it is impossible to separately
identify age, time and cohort effects (See Gosling, Machin and Meghir,
1996) and some assumption has to be made about one of these.
8. Information on all cohorts is available on request.
ENDNOTES
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9. Of course, there are other models that predict increasing life cycle
covariances  within  a  cohort.   For example,  a model whereby human
25
capital is acquired with age at different rates across individuals will
lead to increasing wage dispersion with age.
10. I also experimented with a weighting matrix that contained in
each cell the corresponding number of observations used to compute
each autocovariance, as such, giving less weight to covariances of
greater distance apart. The results obtained from such an exercise were
not unduly different from the equally weighted estimates.
11. All the analysis presented here is in terms of the autocovariance
structure of wage levels.  One might believe that constructing the
autocovariance structure of first differenced wages would simplify the
analysis and provide a clearer split between the permanent and
transitory components.  However, the levels model I have presented
here with changing “price” terms on the permanent and transitory
components has some intuitive appeal.  First differencing this model
would not remove the permanent effect because of the changing “price”
term and would actually complicate the model further.  
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TABLE 1
Structure of the Panel by Cohort -
Per cent of cohort present after given number of years
Cohort born 1963
Year Sample
size
% of
these
present
after 1
year
% of
these
present
after 3
years
% of
these
present
after 5
years
% of
these
present
after 10
years
% of
these
present
after 15
years
% of
these
present
after 19
years
1985 1754 72 64 60 - - -
1990 2087 75 68 - - - -
Cohort born 1953
Year Sample
size
% of
these
present
after 1
year
% of
these
present
after 3
years
% of
these
present
after 5
years
% of
these
present
after 10
years
% of
these
present
after 15
years
% of
these
present
after 19
years
1975 1679 68 65 61 56 57 51
1980 1955 69 67 61 59 - -
1985 1761 76 72 67 - - -
1990 1827 81 71 - - - -
Cohort born 1943
Year Sample
size
% of
these
present
after 1
year
% of
these
present
after 3
years
% of
these
present
after 5
years
% of
these
present
after 10
years
% of
these
present
after 15
years
% of
these
present
after 19
years
1975 1625 71 68 62 57 59 47
1980 1718 70 67 62 61 - -
1985 1579 78 73 70 - - -
1990 1613 79 66 - - - -
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TABLE 1 continued
Structure of the Panel by Cohort -
Per cent of cohort present after given number of years
Cohort born 1933
Year Sample
size
% of
these
present
after 1
year
% of
these
present
after 3
years
% of
these
present
after 5
years
% of
these
present
after 10
years
% of
these
present
after 15
years
% of
these
present
after 19
years
1975 1628 72 68 64 55 44 -
1980 1693 70 65 59 46 - -
1985 1421 77 67 58 - - -
1990 1165  75 - - - - -
Cohort born 1923
Year Sample
size
% of
these
present
after 1
year
% of
these
present
after 3
years
% of
these
present
after 5
years
% of
these
present
after 10
years
% of
these
present
after 15
years
% of
these
present
after 19
years
1975 1779 71 68 63 - - -
1980 1724  68 - - - - -
Source: New Earnings Survey Micro Data.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of Log Hourly Earnings each Year
Year Average
Log Real
Hourly
Wage
10th
Percentile
Log Real
Hourly Wage
50th
Percentile
Log Real
Hourly Wage
90th
Percentile
Log Real
Hourly Wage
Standard
Deviation Log
Real Hourly
Earnings
Sample
Size
1975 1.760 1.363 1.716 2.225 0.356 65224
1976 1.787 1.383 1.738 2.272 0.365 69406
1977 1.711 1.321 1.662 2.182 0.355 69475
1978 1.759 1.353 1.711 2.244 0.362 68862
1979 1.787 1.374 1.746 2.268 0.364 68492
1980 1.794 1.370 1.749 2.286 0.372 68474
1981 1.821 1.376 1.769 2.350 0.393 66736
1982 1.827 1.369 1.780 2.364 0.401 66227
1983 1.872 1.407 1.824 2.426 0.408 65060
1984 1.892 1.412 1.847 2.451 0.415 63862
1985 1.890 1.403 1.846 2.449 0.418 61277
1986 1.938 1.443 1.894 2.507 0.427 63059
1987 1.967 1.453 1.920 2.549 0.442 62536
1988 2.006 1.480 1.959 2.604 0.453 64954
1989 2.011 1.477 1.962 2.621 0.463 64837
1990 2.010 1.467 1.959 2.626 0.466 64801
1991 2.040 1.482 1.993 2.667 0.475 64049
1992 2.060 1.495 2.015 2.702 0.480 61375
1993 2.083 1.504 2.040 2.723 0.490 59751
1994 2.073 1.489 2.030 2.723 0.497 60392
Source: New Earnings Survey Micro Data.
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TABLE 3
Error Components Models for Log Real Hourly Earnings
Random Effect
 + White Noise
Random Effect
 + ARMA(1,1)
at (Random Effect)
+ dt ARMA(1,1)
at (Random Walk) 
+ dt ARMA(1,1)
at (Random Walk to 41)
+ dt ARMA(1,1)
s 2µ .1295   (.0008) .0666   (.0056) .0124   (.0032) 6.6E-10  (.0037)
a75 = 1
a76
a77
a78
a79
a80
a81
a82
a83
a84
a85
a86
a87
a88
a89
a90
a91
a92
a93
a94
 
1.0987   (.0707)
1.0796   (.0742)
0.9281   (.0731)
0.6862   (.0879)
0.9052   (.0812)
1.3060   (.0943)
1.3429   (.1028)
1.3313   (.1047)
1.5323   (.1251)
1.6139   (.1379)
1.6369   (.1380)
1.7531   (.1504)
1.5157   (.1342)
1.2688   (.1188)
1.1851   (.1149)
1.0742   (.1148)
1.0138   (.1167)
0.9664   (.1217)
0.8495   (.1278)
1.0133   (.0219)
1.0087   (.0229)
0.9874   (.0230)
0.9604   (.0236)
0.9934   (.0253)
1.0690   (.0265)
1.1121   (.0280)
1.1069   (.0290)
1.1220   (.0306)
1.1147   (.0314)
1.1166   (.0324)
1.1349   (.0345)
1.1174   (.0359)
1.1080   (.0371)
1.1136   (.0382)
1.1082   (.0412)
1.1415   (.0453)
1.1846   (.0509)
1.1799   (.0543)
1.0666   (.0248)
1.0670   (.0269)
1.0787   (.0279)
1.0468   (.0291)
1.1031   (.0320)
1.2237   (.0342)
1.2448   (.0357)
1.2503   (.0377)
1.2658   (.0384)
1.2553   (.0393)
1.2560   (.0398)
1.2827   (.0412)
1.2726   (.0415)
1.2723   (.0417)
1.2700   (.0420)
1.2906   (.0436)
1.3116   (.0453)
1.3339   (.0483)
1.3041   (.0497)
? .9441   (.0047) .9721   (.0012) .9794   (.0013) .9567   (.0012)
? -.4762   (.0071) -.5327    (.0057) -.6367   (.0074) -.5693   (.0068)
s 2f .0351   (.0003) .0240    (.0005) .0199   (.0006) .0242   (.0011)
s 2e .0429   (.0003)
d75 = 1
d76
d77
d78
d79
d80
d81
d82
d83
d84
d85
d86
d87
d88
d89
d90
d91
d92
d93
d94
1.0283   (.0084)
0.9981   (.0089)
1.0393   (.0086)
1.0552   (.0095)
1.0585   (.0098)
1.0983   (.0122)
1.1125   (.0132)
1.1291   (.0135)
1.1125   (.0164)
1.1061   (.0191)
1.1355   (.0201)
1.1669   (.0224)
1.2307   (.0172)
1.3032   (.0144)
1.3227   (.0136)
1.3756   (.0136)
1.4084   (.0139)
1.4462   (.0146)
1.4787   (.0152)
1.0470   (.0138)
0.9979   (.0143)
1.0292   (.0151)
1.0124   (.0158)
1.0403   (.0164)
1.1306   (.0171)
1.1301   (.0173)
1.1534   (.0181)
1.1629   (.0185)
1.1757   (.0192)
1.2197   (.0204)
1.2761   (.0221)
1.3260   (.0239)
1.3839   (.0257)
1.3938   (.0263)
1.4440   (.0284)
1.4551   (.0294)
1.4700   (.0310)
1.4932   (.0337)
0.9957   (.0194)
0.9263   (.0211)
0.9446   (.0216)
0.9465   (.0239)
0.9425   (.0251)
0.9813   (.0247)
0.9937   (.0257)
1.0162   (.0275)
1.0240   (.0276)
1.0488   (.0288)
1.1102   (.0296)
1.1702   (.0312)
1.2353   (.0322)
1.3055   (.0332)
1.3244   (.0333)
1.3584   (.0348)
1.3706   (.0360)
1.3963   (.0385)
1.4573   (.0405)
s 2p  .0025   (.0001)
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TABLE 3 continued
s 2p 23 
s 2p 24 
s 2p 25 
s 2p 26 
s 2p 27 
s 2p 28 
s 2p 29 
s 2p 30 
s 2p 31 
s 2p 32 
s 2p 33 
s 2p 34 
s 2p 35 
s 2p 36 
s 2p 37 
s 2p 38 
s 2p 39 
s 2p 40 
s 2p 41 
.0054   (.0005)
.0057   (.0006)
.0070   (.0006)
.0046   (.0006)
.0052   (.0006)
.0053   (.0006)
.0044   (.0006)
.0039   (.0006)
.0040   (.0006)
.0043   (.0007)
.0037   (.0007)
.0032   (.0007)
.0030   (.0008)
.0033   (.0008)
.0021   (.0008)
.0013   (.0008)
.0010   (.0008)
.0006   (.0008)
.0035   (.0012)
?2 (DF) 127780   (6608) 84484   (6606) 41959   (6568) 19248   (6567) 11539    (6550)
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FIGURE 1
Auto-Covariances for Selected Cohorts:  1975-94
Cohort born 1963
Cohort born 1953
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FIGURE 1 continued
Auto-Covariances for Selected Cohorts:  1975-94
Cohort born 1943
Cohort born 1933
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FIGURE 1 continued
Auto-Covariances for Selected Cohorts:  1975-94
Cohort born 1923
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FIGURE 2
The Life Cycle Profile of Variances and Covariances:  1975-94 
1975
       
1980
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FIGURE 2 continued
The Life Cycle Profile of Variances and Covariances:  1975-94
1985
1990
36
FIGURE 2 continued
The Life Cycle Profile of Variances and Covariances:  1975-94
1994
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FIGURE 3
Actual and Predicted Variances for Selected Cohorts:  1975-94
Cohort born 1963
Cohort born 1953
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FIGURE 3 continued
Actual and Predicted Variances for Selected Cohorts:  1975-94
Cohort born 1943
Cohort born 1933
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FIGURE 3 continued
Actual and Predicted Variances for Selected Cohorts:  1975-94
Cohort born 1923
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FIGURE 4
Permanent and Transitory Effects on the Predicted Variances
for Selected Cohorts:  1975-94
Cohort born 1963
Cohort born 1953
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FIGURE 4 continued
Permanent and Transitory Effects on the Predicted Variances
for
Selected Cohorts: 1975-94
Coho rt born
1943
Coho rt born
1933
42
FIGURE 4 continued
Permanent and Transitory Effects on the Predicted Variances
for
Selected Cohorts: 1975-94
Coho r t
b o r n 1923
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
In this appendix I present the statistical methods employed in this
paper for computing the covariances of earnings for each cohort and for
estimating error component models for individual earnings.  The
methodology used is the same as that utilised by Abowd and Card
(1989), except that here I have an unbalanced panel of individuals.  For
each cohort c and individual i, define a vector:
where dcit is an indicator variable such that:
  dcit = 1 if the individual is present in year t of the panel.
 dcit = 0 otherwise.
and Tc is the total length of the panel for each cohort (between 1 and
20 years).
Analogously to dci , define a vector:
where wcit are log hourly earnings for cohort c and individual i in year
t, in mean deviation form for each cohort and year.  Since the panel is
unbalanced the elements of wci corresponding to missing years of data
will be set to zero.
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Cc '
j
i'Nc
i'1
wci w
)
ci
Dc
Dc ' j
i'Nc
i'1
dci d
)
ci
Vc '
j
i'Nc
i'1
(mc & mci) (mc & mci)
)
pc p
)
c
The covariance matrix of log hourly earnings for each cohort is
then computed as:
where Nc is the total number of individuals in the cohort and 
Define mc to be a vector of the distinct elements of the covariance
matrix Cc, mc = vech(Cc).  Since Cc is symmetric there are Tc (Tc +1)/2
elements in  mc.   Conformably  with  mc,  define  mci  to be the distinct
elements of the individual cross product matrix wci wciN.  Similarly, let
pc be a vector of the distinct elements of  Dc.  Chamberlain (1984)
proves
that, under some fairly general conditions, independence of the wci
implies that  mc  has an asymptotic  normal  distribution  mc ~ N(mc,Vc).
Where Vc can be estimated by:
Now define the vector m to be the vertical concatenation of all
the mc vectors.  To estimate the error components models of Section 5
we want to fit the elements of m to a parameter vector b, so that m =
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f(b).  Minimum distance estimation involves minimising the following
quadratic form:  (m - f(b)) A (m - f(b))N  where A is an appropriate
weighting matrix.
Chamberlain  (1984)  shows that the optimal choice for A is  V -1,
where V is a block diagonal matrix which is constructed from all the Vc
matrices.  However, Altonji and Segal (1994) provide Monte Carlo
evidence that optimal minimum distance (OMD) is seriously biased in
small samples.  This bias arises from the correlation between sampling
errors in the second moments, m, and the weighting matrix of fourth
moments, V -1.  They present an alternative estimator, the
independently weighted optimal minimum distance estimator
(IWOMD) but conclude that equally weighted estimation (where A is
an identity matrix) is often preferable.  I follow their procedure and use
equally weighted minimum distance estimation.
Following Chamberlain (1984), the standard errors of the
estimated parameters are obtained from the following formula:
(GNAG)-1 GNAVAG (GNAG)-1
where G is the T*P gradient matrix df(b)/db evaluated at b*, the
estimated value of b, where T is the sum across cohorts of Tc(Tc+1)/2)
and P is the number of parameters.
Under the hypothesis of a correct specification the minimised
quadratic form:
(m - f(b*)) V-1 (m - f(b*))N
has a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the
dimension of m (=T) minus the number of parameters P.  This is the test
statistic presented in Table 3.
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